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Abstract According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know (E = K). 
According to his critics, it doesn’t. While E = K calls for revision, the revisions it calls for are minor. E = K gets 
this much right. Only true propositions can constitute evidence and anything you know non-inferentially is part 
of your evidence. In this paper, I defend these two theses about evidence and its possession from Williamson’s 
critics who think we should break more radically from E = K. 
1 Introduction 
According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know: 
E = K: S’s evidence includes p iff S knows p.1 
According to Williamson’s critics, it doesn’t.2 They typically prefer views on which your evidence is constituted 
by the propositions that are the contents of your non- factive mental states. To give these views a name, let’s say 
his critics typically prefer E = B to E = K. According to E = B, the conditions that distinguish cases of knowing 
from (justifiably, perhaps) believing or seeing from seeming to see are not among those that determine what 
evidence you have.3 It’s not what you know 
1 Williamson (2000: 185). 
2 For critical discussions of Williamson’s view of evidence, see Comesan ̃a and Kantin (2010), Conee and Feldman (2008), Dodd 
(2007), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Goldman (2009), Littlejohn (2010), Rizzieri (2010), Silins (2005), and Turri (2009). 
3 On one version of E = B, our evidence will consist of those propositions that are the contents of non- factive experiential states. On 
another, our evidence will consist of those propositions we justifiably believe, say, on the basis of non-factive experiential states. 
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that determines what evidence you have; rather, it’s your non-factive mental states that determine what evidence 
you have.4 Whereas E = K implies that you and your systematically deceived mental duplicate have different 
evidence, E = B can avoid these externalist implications and so avoid the difficulties thought to arise for 
Williamson. In this paper, I shall insert myself into this debate between Williamson and his critics to argue that 
Williamson is closer to getting things right than his critics are. To be sure, we should revise E = K. E = K needs 
tiny revisions. An externalist view on which your evidence consists of the true propositions you know non-
inferentially avoids the objections to E = K we should avoid and is preferable to E = B. 
In §1, I explain why E = K needs revision and defend some positive proposals about evidence and its possession 
in §2. Williamson and I agree that evidence consists of facts or true propositions. We agree that anything you 
know non- inferentially will be included in your evidence. We disagree on two points. He thinks your evidence 
includes what you know inferentially, but I do not. He thinks your evidence includes only what you know, but I 
do not. In §3, I shall address those who say that we should break more radically from E = K and say that false 
propositions can constitute evidence. 
Because the notion of evidence is so slippery, it is hard to know how to test competing accounts of this notion. 
Here are some general guidelines I think most of us can agree should be followed. Some claims about evidence 
seem to be platitudes. If an account of evidence cannot accommodate some platitude, this is a mark against it. 
There are claims about the role evidence plays in inference, explanation, and the justification of belief we want 
our account of evidence to accommodate. If an account of evidence cannot accommodate some these claims, this 
is a mark against it. There are intuitions about evidence ascription that many of us share. If an account of 
evidence cannot accommodate intuitions about evidence ascription, this is a mark against it. It would be good if 
an account could accommodate the data without positing ambiguity. Simple accounts are preferable to 
complicated accounts that combine concepts in unnatural ways. 
Let’s start with some platitudes. It seems to be a platitude about evidence that a subject’s evidence is what that 
subject has to go on in trying to arrive at a view.5 I would go further and add that a subject’s evidence is limited 
to those things that the subject can properly treat as reasons for belief without needing antecedent justified beliefs 
to justify treating these considerations as proper starting points for deliberation. It also seems to be a platitude 
about evidence that a piece of evidence is something that could serve as a reason (or partial reason) for belief in 
the sense that it can go towards explaining why the subject justifiably or rationally believes a proposition. The 
explanation is not (just) a psychological explanation that explains how the subject ended up in the mental states 
she’s in, but an explanation as to how those states could have the normative properties that interest 
4 Obviously, not every non-factive mental state determines what evidence you have. It doesn’t seem that two subjects that differ in their 
desires thereby differ in what evidence they have. If you are so inclined, you can tack on some sort of reliability condition and say that only 
non-factive mental states produced by processes that reliably lead to truth provide evidence. 
5 Kelly (2008: 943). 123 
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epistemologists.6 These platitudes will not tell us which account of evidence is right when taken on their own, but 
it should give the reader some indication what the relevant notion of evidence is. 
2 E=K According to E = K, evidence suffices for knowledge and knowledge suffices for 
evidence: ESK: If p is part of S’s evidence, S knows p. 
KSE: If S knows p, p is part of S’s evidence. 
In this section, we shall look at objections to both parts of E = K. Gettier cases cause various problems for ESK 
and cases of inferential knowledge cause problems for KSE. These problems do not arise for E = B, but they also 
do not arise for an externalist view that says that your evidence consists of true propositions you know non-
inferentially or are non-inferentially justified in believing. I shall defend some positive claims about evidence 
later. Let’s first look at the objections to ESK and KSE. 
2.1 Evidence Without Knowledge 
The first objection to ESK is that it clashes with what appears to be a platitude about evidence and access: 
UA: S has (epistemically) unproblematic access to her evidence. 
This captures the idea that if it is not proper for you to treat some proposition as a reason for forming beliefs 
because you do not have unproblematic access to the facts that determine whether this proposition is true, the 
proposition is something you might come to justifiably accept, but only after you find some more basic 
considerations to justify its acceptance. Until then, it cannot be part of your evidence for justifying further beliefs 
of yours. 
What is it to have unproblematic access to your evidence? Silins has suggested that it is to have armchair access 
to your evidence: 
AA: If p is part of S’s evidence, it is possible for S to know that p is part of S’s evidence from the armchair 
(i.e., to know that p is part of S’s evidence in such a way that the belief that p is part of S’s evidence does not 
depend upon experience for its justification).7 
If this is right, E = K is in trouble. Assuming we have knowledge of the external world, we cannot accept both 
AA and E = K. Taken together, AA and E = K imply that anything you know can be known from the armchair 
alone. To see this, assume these two claims are true: 
6 Silins (2005: 376). 7 Silins (2005: 381). 
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(1) (2) 
S knows that E = K is true from the armchair.8 S knows p on the basis of observation. 
Now, consider: 
(3) p is part of S’s evidence. [(1), (2)] (4) If p is part of S’s evidence, S could know that p is part of S’s 
evidence from the 
armchair alone. [(AA)] (5) S knows that p is part of S’s evidence from the armchair alone. [(3), (4)] (6)
 S knows from the armchair that if S knows that p is part of S’s evidence from 
the armchair alone, p can be known to S from the armchair alone. [(1)] (7) S can know p from the armchair 
alone. [(5), (6), and K-Closure] 
The result that anything you know can be known from the armchair is clearly intolerable. Among the things we 
know are propositions we have strong empirical justification for believing.9 To avoid it, Silins encourages us to 
reject E = K. Owing to the factivity of knowledge, if E = K is false, so is (1). 
He offers a second objection to E = K. Let’s suppose: (8) S knows p on the basis of observation. Now, consider: 
(9) p is part of S’s evidence. [(8), (KSE)] (10) S can know that p is part of S’s evidence from the armchair 
alone. [(9), (AA)] (11) S can know that her belief that p constitutes knowledge from the armchair 
alone [(1), (10)] (12) S knows from the armchair that if her belief that p is true constitutes 
knowledge, her belief is not Gettiered. (13) S can know from the armchair alone that her belief that p is true is 
not 
Gettiered. [(11), (12), K-Closure] 
Like Silins, I do not think that (13) is a consequence of (8). Fake barn detection isn’t this easy. The processes we 
use to determine what evidence we have does not require or provide for us the evidence we need to know if our 
beliefs are Gettiered. To avoid the conclusion that any belief that constitutes observational knowledge is a belief 
we can know isn’t Gettiered from the armchair, he thinks we should deny (11) and ESK. 
Both objections assume AA. If UA really did support AA, we would have good reason to reject E = K. I do not 
think AA really captures the intuition that makes UA so appealing. To argue from UA to AA and then to the 
further claim that nothing we 
8 E = KdoesnotimplythatE = Kcanbeknownfromthearmchair.E = KdoesnotimplythatE = K can be known. I do not think that anyone 
thinks that the way to deal with Silins’ objection is to say that E = K isn’t known or isn’t known from the armchair. 
9 Let’s say that S’s justification for believing p is strong empirical justification if it is impossible to have that very justification from the 
armchair alone. S’s justification for believing p is weak empirical justification if that very justification could have been had from the armchair 
alone but depends constitutively upon the subject’s experiences. 
123 
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know about the external world that we cannot know from the armchair could constitute evidence, we have to 
assume that we have only problematic access to the relevant truths about the external world. It seems deeply 
counterintuitive to say that the access we have to facts we know non-inferentially is epistemically problematic. 
(If the epistemic access you have to p is epistemically problematic, it seems you could not know p non-
inferentially, you would need additional reasons to believe p so that your epistemic position with respect to p is 
not problematic.) It seems rather plausible that we can have non-inferential knowledge of the external world. So, 
it seems there should be some features of the external world we have unproblematic access to, such as those 
features we can know about directly via observation. The upshot seems to be that AA cannot receive significant 
support from the relatively uncontroversial claim that we enjoy unproblematic access to our evidence. 
Perhaps UA supports something weaker than AA: 
AE: If p is part of S’s evidence, it is possible for S to know that p is part of S’s evidence without needing any 
empirical justification for believing that p is part of S’s evidence beyond the justification needed for p to be part 
of S’s evidence. 
One problem with AA was that it implied that the justification we have for second- order beliefs about our own 
evidence (e.g., the belief that p is part of our evidence) is independent from any strong empirical justification. 
This suggests that having this strong empirical justification will not be part of what determines what our evidence 
is.10 To avoid these difficulties, we have to adopt a very restrictive account of evidence. We have to say that facts 
about the external world that we know non- inferentially are excluded from our evidence even though, 
intuitively, our access to these facts is not epistemically problematic. The idea behind the move from AA to AE 
is simple enough. AE allows that it is possible for you to possess p as part of your evidence even if this requires 
having strong empirical justification for believing p, a justification that might make access to p unproblematic. 
AE insists that you do not any strong empirical justification for believing that p is part of your evidence beyond 
whatever strong empirical justification is needed for p to get into your evidence. So, it denies that you need to 
check the world to find out what evidence you have once you have it and does not imply that access to the 
external world is always epistemically problematic. 
If we replace AA with AE, the first of Silins’ objections to E = K does not get off the ground. The second 
objection remains. Intuitively, it seems that more strong empirical justification is needed for justifiably believing 
that your belief in p is not Gettiered than is needed for p to be part of your evidence. So, Silins’ second objection 
forces us to choose between KSE and ESK. Forced to choose but inclined 
10 To see this, remember that on AA, if p is part of your evidence, you are in a position to know that this is so from the armchair. 
Assume that you can know from the armchair whether you need strong empirical justification to have something in your evidence, the problem 
discussed above with E = K would arise anew. Combine (i) the claim that you can know from armchair that p is part of your evidence, (ii) that 
you can know from the armchair that you could not have p as part of your evidence unless you had strong empirical justification for believing 
p, and you get the unfortunate result that you can know things from the armchair that cannot be known from the armchair (e.g., that you have 
strong empirical justification for believing p). 
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to retain as much of E = K as possible, I would choose KSE over ESK. And, forced to choose between AE and 
ESK, I would choose AE. If we were to choose ESK over AE, we would have to say that while p is part of S’s 
evidence, this fact does not put S in a position to know that p is part of S’s evidence. S would need additional 
empirical evidence to know that her belief in p is not Gettiered. It takes a considerable amount of evidence to 
know that some particular belief is not Gettiered. It would require having evidence that p is true, evidence that 
this evidence does not lead to the truth accidentally, and evidence that there are no knowledge defeaters. 
Intuitively, knowing that something is part of your evidence does not require knowledge of these very 
complicated facts. If you can know p non- inferentially without being in a position to know whether your belief 
in p is Gettiered and your evidence is whatever it is that you have unproblematic access to that you can rightly 
reason from to further beliefs, doesn’t it seem plausible that you have the necessary access to p for p to be part of 
your evidence if you know p non- inferentially? Won’t you have the necessary access even if you do not have 
knowledge-level evidence for believing that your belief in p is not Gettiered? 
The reader might not be convinced that AE is true and wonder if it wouldn’t be better to hold onto ESK than AE. 
I don’t think so. We do not need AE to cause trouble for ESK. Suppose a non-factive mental duplicate of yours 
sees a real barn, a barn that is qualitatively identical to the barn you know you saw on your drive through real 
barn country. Suppose this subject’s barn is surrounded by a sufficient number of fakes so that this subject 
doesn’t know the building that she saw was a barn. We can stipulate that her belief is true and reasonably held. It 
seems counterintuitive to say that she has less evidence than you just because of the fake barns. I can’t think of 
any principled reason to think that your evidence couldn’t include the proposition that the building you saw was 
a barn, so it is tempting to say that your counterpart’s evidence includes a proposition she doesn’t know is true— 
that the building she saw was a barn. Also, it seems that the difference in what you two know is due to extra-
evidential factors (e.g., the presence of fakes in her case and the absence of fakes in yours). This style of 
explanation is ruled out by ESK. ESK implies that if your counterpart’s evidence includes the proposition that 
the building she saw was a barn, the subject would know that the building was a barn and so would not be in a 
Gettier case. So, ESK fails to accommodate intuition and rules out a plausible explanation of that intuition. 
2.2 Knowledge Without Evidence 
I don’t think it follows from the fact that S knows p that p is part of S’s evidence, but I do think that if S knows p 
non-inferentially, p part of S’s evidence. In this section, I shall argue against KSE and defend in its place this 
weaker principle: 
IKSE: If S knows p non-inferentially, S’s evidence includes p.11 
11 Maher (1996) defends the view that our evidence includes what we know on the basis of observation and so I imagine he would be 
sympathetic to IKSE. Weatherson has expressed sympathy for a view in the neighborhood of this one, a view on which your evidence is what 
you know as the output of a Fodorian module. I don’t know if this view has appeared in print. 
123 
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Inference is not a process you use to gain new evidence. In inference you put your evidence to work to settle 
questions. This does not sit well with KSE. KSE implies that if you use some process to acquire knowledge, that 
process just is a process by which gain new evidence. This seems counterintuitive. S knows p non- inferentially. 
S deduces competently the disjunctive proposition that p or q. S then competently deduces that if *p, then q is 
true. As S adds more and more trivial consequences of p to her set beliefs, it is intuitive to say that she’ll know 
things she did not know previously but it is not intuitive to say that she acquires new evidence each time she 
learns a new trivial consequence of p. 
Someone could say that this seems intuitive only if we’re working with a very narrow conception of evidence.12 I 
admit that there is a perfectly good sense in which the known deductive consequences of propositions included in 
your evidence can serve as reasons for believing further propositions. For examples, see above. There is a 
perfectly good sense in which the disjunctive proposition, p or q, is a reason for me to believe the conditional 
proposition, if *p, then q. I know the disjunction, I know that the conditional is a consequence of the disjunction, 
and if I’m a logic novice, I might not be able to move directly from p to if *p then q without reasoning through 
the disjunction. So, there’s a sense in which the disjunctive proposition is a reason for me to believe the 
conditional. So, am I working with an overly narrow conception of evidence? 
I don’t think so. Comfortably seated in my apartment, I read an article about foxes. It says that scientists 
observed that female foxes often ate berries and observed no male foxes that did likewise. Hundreds of foxes 
were examined carefully, all foxes were quite hungry, and that’s what they saw. ‘How fascinating,’ I thought. I 
look out the window and see a fox in the yard. I see that it is eating blueberries off of the bush. I judge: 
(1) There is a female fox in my yard. 
I know (1) is true on the basis of inductive inference and observation. I know that all female foxes are vixens and 
so I deduce: 
(2) There is a vixen in my yard. 
There are two things about this case. First, since the grounds for believing (1) were inductive grounds, the 
evidential probability of (1) should be less than 1. Second, when I deduce (2) from (1), the evidential probability 
of (2) is not greater than (1) was prior to believing (2). We can stipulate that I do not have grounds for believing 
(2) independent from the grounds that support (1), so the evidential probability of (2) should also remain less 
than 1. 
Both these things could be true if IKSE is true, but not if KSE is true. If (1) is something I know initially on 
inductive grounds, KSE says that (1) is part of my evidence, so I can deduce that (2) is true from propositions 
included in my evidence and then deduce that (*1) is inconsistent with my evidence. But, then it seems that the 
evidential probability of (1) is 1 even if I observe nothing new. Because it’s an 
12 An anonymous referee raised this worry. 
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obvious logical consequence of a propositions included in my evidence (i.e., (1)), the evidential probability of (2) 
is 1. But, then it seems that since I know (2), KSE says that it is part of my evidence now. If I reason from (1) to 
(2) and back to (1), the evidential probability of my belief in (1) starts below 1 when initially formed and then 
increases to 1 when I deduce it from (2). The evidential probability of (1) could potentially increase if I were to 
acquire new evidence, but it shouldn’t increase by reasoning from things that I deduce from (1) even if I come to 
know things by means of these deductive inferences that entail (1).13 
So, I don’t think you’re necessarily working with an overly narrow conception of evidence you think it’s a 
mistake to say that your evidence includes things you know inferentially. If the evidential probabilities of the 
propositions we believe are determined by the evidence, it does not seem that among the propositions that we 
conditionalize on are propositions we know on inductive grounds.14 Either we deny that we can know things on 
inductive grounds or we should say that there is a difference between acquiring new knowledge and acquiring 
new evidence. This is a difference without a difference according to KSE, not IKSE. 
If we revise KSE to accommodate the intuition that a subject lacks entailing evidence for the deductive 
consequences what she knows on inductive grounds (e.g., that only vixens eat blueberries), we have to recognize 
a distinction between this subject’s evidence and her derivative reasons for belief. Evidence and derivative 
reasons for belief do some of the same things. Both can play a part in rationalizing the formation of beliefs, for 
example. They differ in that the propositions that constitute her evidence fix evidential probabilities, the 
propositions that constitute derivative reasons for belief do not. Belief in the propositions that constitute 
derivative reasons for belief enable her to apply old evidence to form new beliefs without inserting their contents 
in her stockpile of evidence. So, these beliefs transmit support without generating new support or strengthening 
old support provided by the evidence. 
13 The argument is inspired by an argument of Dodd’s (2007) that purports to show that E = K engenders scepticism. Williamson has resources 
for dealing with Dodd’s objection. For discussion, see Littlejohn (2008). 
14 In the course of criticizing an account of evidence on which evidence is non-factive, Williamson notes that it is not clear how 
someone working with a non-factive conception of evidence could rule out the possibility of having bodies of evidence that include logically 
inconsistent propositions. For example, suppose you think there can be false, non-inferentially justified beliefs and you are tempted to identify 
a subject’s evidence with the propositions that subject is non-inferentially justified in believing. Many have the intuition that it is possible to 
justifiably believe inconsistent propositions (provided that you do not appreciate that they are inconsistent), so it seems you would have to 
allow for the possibility that someone could have a body of evidence that includes two or more propositions that are inconsistent with one 
another. Williamson observes, ‘‘there are grave difficulties in making sense of the evidential probabilities on inconsistent evidence, since 
conditional probabilities are usually taken to be undefined when conditioned on something inconsistent. In particular, any proposition has a 
probability 1 conditional on itself and any contradiction has probability 0 on anything ... but these constraints cannot both be met for 
probabilities conditional on a contradiction’’ (2009: 310). We can add this to the list of reasons to think evidence is factive. I mention this here 
because it is clear textual evidence that Williamson takes evidence to be the thing that determines the evidential probabilities of what we 
believe. So, we should be able to rely on our intuitive sense of whether certain hypotheses are consistent with someone’s evidence to determine 
what the elements of someone’s body of evidence is. If, as is plausible, we think that we can know p on inductive grounds when the evidential 
probability of p on such grounds is less than 1, there is a problem for KSE. 
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Without belief in the propositions that constitute derivative reasons, our evidence could not rationalize beliefs 
upstream (e.g., deductive consequences of things known via induction).15 With belief in these propositions, the 
evidential support provided to her inferential beliefs does not get any stronger. 
Little is lost if we replace KSE with IKSE. I have said little to motivate IKSE, so let me explain why I think 
IKSE must be true. Consider a stronger principle: 
IJSE: If S’s belief that p is non-inferentially justified and p is a piece of evidence, p is included in S’s evidence. 
If knowledge requires justified belief, IKSE is a consequence of IJSE. In support of IJSE, Fantl and McGrath 
remark, ‘‘If your justification for a proposition is good enough for knowledge, then if it isn’t among your reasons 
for belief, it’s not for shortcomings in your epistemic position with respect to it’’.16 They leave it open that 
something other than a weakness in your epistemic position might prevent p from being part of your evidence. It 
might be that p is not evidence, for example. I’ve added a proviso to take care of that. If p is not a bit of evidence 
but you are non- inferentially justified in believing p, IJSE does not say that p is part of your evidence. To show 
that IJSE is false, you would have to show that in spite of the fact that p is a bit of evidence and in spite of the 
fact that S’s belief in p is non- inferentially justified, p is not part of S’s evidence. Here’s why I don’t think 
arguments against IJSE will be persuasive. If we think of your evidence as what you have the right to reason 
from to justify further beliefs, cases that cause trouble for IJSE would be cases where it seems intuitive for us to 
say that while S’s belief that p was justified it would be improper for S to treat p as a reason for forming any 
further beliefs because the relationship between S and p is epistemically problematic. If that problematic relation 
did not constitute a decisive reason to refrain from treating p as a reason for belief, it wouldn’t threaten IJSE. If, 
however, the relation between S and p is epistemically problematic in such a way that there’s a decisive 
epistemic reason for S to refrain from treating p as a reason for belief, that would seem to be just the sort of 
reason that would defeat the justification S had for believing p.17 The intuitions that support this last point are 
precisely the sort of intuitions that lend support to closure principles for justification, principles that say that 
when the connection between p and q is sufficiently obvious to S, S will be in a sufficiently strong epistemic 
position to justifiably believe q if she justifiably believes p. 
If this is an adequate motivation for IJSE, it should do the same for IKSE. If you think we can acquire evidence 
by means of direct observation, you should think that IKSE is true. Internalist and externalist about justified 
belief can endorse IKSE because IKSE it is consistent with two further assumptions internalists often defend 
15 To foreshadow just a bit, once we distinguish between the propositions that constitute evidence and the propositions that constitute 
derivative reasons for belief, we then have to say that if only justified beliefs provide reasons that justify further beliefs, not every justified 
belief will be a belief whose content is part of a believer’s stockpile of evidence. 
16 Fantl and McGrath (2009: 98). 17 Williamson (2007b) defends the justification requirement for knowledge on these sorts of 
grounds. 
123 
250 C. Littlejohn 
that externalists need not deny. The first is that some sort of liberal foundationalism is true: 
LF: Among the propositions that we know non-inferentially are e-propositions, propositions about the 
external world whose truth or falsity is not determined exclusively by facts about our non-factive mental states.18 
The second is that this mentalist supervenience thesis is true: ESM: If two subjects are in the same non-
factive mental states, p is part of the first 
subject’s evidence iff p is part of the second subject’s evidence.19 
Supervenience internalists who say that we have the same evidence in the good case and bad can combine LF, 
ESM, and IKSE. There is nothing wrong with saying that subjects in the good case have e-propositions in their 
evidence provided that these propositions get into a subject’s evidence in the bad case as well and nothing in 
these three claims rules that out. So, IKSE is consistent with a popular form of internalism.20 IKSE is also 
consistent with the externalist views on which we have more evidence in the good case than the bad. So, IKSE 
seems like a relatively innocuous claim about the possession evidence. 
3 It’s Not the Thought That Counts 
I argued in the previous section that p is part of your evidence if you know p non- inferentially. IKSE and IJSE 
tell us nothing about what constitutes evidence, they only tell us when bits of evidence get into bodies of 
evidence. In this section, I shall say something about what bits of evidence are. I shall argue for the factivity of 
evidence: 
EST: If p is part of S’s evidence, p is true. 
I am proposing a sufficient condition for the possession evidence (IKSE) and a necessary condition for the 
constitution of evidence (EST), but I’m not offering necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘p is part of S’s 
evidence’. Someone who accepts EST and IKSE could say that your evidence is everything you know non- 
inferentially, but that might run into problems with Gettier intuitions. Instead, you might say that your evidence 
consists of all the truths that you are non-inferentially justified in believing. Williamson objects to this second 
view on the grounds, ‘‘such 
18 See Feldman (2004) and Pryor (2000). 
19 For defenses of ESM, see Audi (2001), Conee and Feldman (2004), Pryor (2000), and Silins (2005). 
20 You cannot combine ESM with IKSE if you also insist that evidence consists only of true propositions. If the truth of a proposition 
were required for that proposition to constitutive evidence, then we could not combine IKSE, ESM, and LF. According to LF, it is possible for 
someone to know an e-proposition non- inferentially. According to IKSE, if someone knows an e-proposition non-inferentially, this proposition 
is part of the subject’s evidence. However, according to ESM, this proposition can be part of this subject’s evidence only if it is part of any 
subject’s body of evidence who happens to be a non-factive mental duplicate of our first subject. Among the possible non-factive mental 
duplicates of our subject are subjects that believe the very same e-proposition our first subject does when that proposition is false. 
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a view is a rather unnatural hybrid: the truth-condition is an ad hoc afterthought, not an organic consequence’’.21 
I don’t feel the force of the objection. It’s not obvious to me that we don’t want a hybrid view, such a view might 
be precisely as unnatural as it should be. The account is supposed to tell us what evidence is and what it is to 
have it. If I gave you an account of what it is own a hedgehog and intended the account to explain what 
distinguishes hedgehog owners from cat owners, from hedgehog thieves, and from men sitting near wild 
hedgehogs, the account should be a hybrid. It should tell us something about what distinguishes hedgehogs from 
cats and owners from thieves and people who come across hedgehogs in the wild. You cannot complain that the 
account is a messy hybrid of moral and biological considerations. That is a feature, not a bug. EST is part of a 
non-normative story about what evidence is. Pieces of evidence are facts. IKSE and IJSE are part of a further 
(partially) normative story about what it is to have evidence. Having evidence, like having a hedgehog, is a 
messy and complicated affair and understanding it calls for a messy, hybrid account. 
I’m not the first to offer arguments for EST. Williamson has argued for EST as well. Recently, he offered this 
argument: 
Why is it bad for an assertion to be inconsistent with the evidence? A natural answer is: because then it is false. 
That answer assumes that evidence consists only of true propositions. For if an untrue proposition, p, is evidence, 
the proposition that p is untrue is true but inconsistent with the evidence.22 
I’m sympathetic to the conclusion, but I’m not entirely persuaded by the argument. I imagine that someone who 
rejects EST would say that it is bad for an assertion to be inconsistent with the evidence (in part) because 
evidence is provided by our justified beliefs, beliefs that we are very confident are correct. If you assert p with 
the intention of persuading someone that p and that assertion is inconsistent with propositions they antecedently 
were justified in believing and are currently very confident are true, it will be difficult to persuade your audience 
that p is true. This seems to be a plausible explanation as to why it is bad for an assertion to be inconsistent with 
the evidence your audience has and it does not assume EST. 
Maybe this response to Williamson’s argument does not work. I don’t know what Williamson would say in 
response to the response. What I want to do here is bolster the case for EST by offering two independent 
arguments for it. The first appeals to linguistic intuitions. Reactions have been mixed. Most seem to share the 
relevant intuitions, but some doubt that EST is part of the best explanation of these intuitions. Rather than argue 
that EST provides the best possible explanation of the linguistic data, I will show that it provides an explanation 
of that data. Think of the first argument as a kind of explanatory challenge. If you think EST isn’t true, find an 
explanation of the data that doesn’t assume it. In the absence of one, I think we have some confirming evidence 
for EST. The second argument allows us to prescind 
21 Williamson (2009: 311). This assumes, of course, that the truth of a belief is not a necessary condition for the justification of that 
belief. 
22 Williamson (2007a: 209). 
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from linguistic considerations and focus on the role that evidence plays in explanatory inference. The question, 
‘Why do people weigh less dead than alive?’ rests on a mistake. People don’t lose weight when they die. When 
you know p is part of your evidence, you’re in a position to know that if p is not some brute fact, the question, 
‘Why is it that p?’ does not rest on this sort of mistake. Below, I turn these observations into an argument for 
EST. 
3.1 Linguistic Considerations In this section, I shall present the linguistic evidence for EST. To begin, consider 
two brief 
I. Scarlet: Green: 
II. Scarlet: Green: 
exchanges about an upcoming trial. 
Does the prosecution have solid evidence against Mustard? The prosecution thinks it does. Here’s the evidence 
they have: that he was the last one to see the victim alive, that he lied about his whereabouts on the night of the 
crime, that his fingerprints were on the murder weapon, and that he wrote a letter containing details the police 
think only the killer could have known. Of course, Mustard wasn’t the last person to see him alive, he didn’t lie 
about his whereabouts, and his fingerprints weren’t on the murder weapon. 
Does the prosecution have solid evidence against Mustard? People seem to think they do. Here’s the evidence 
they have: that he was the last one to see the victim alive, that he lied about his whereabouts on the night of the 
crime, that his fingerprints were on the murder weapon, and that he wrote a letter containing details the police 
think only the killer could have known. That being said, I don’t know if he’s the last one who saw the victim 
alive, I don’t know if he lied, I don’t know if his fingerprints were on the murder weapon, and I don’t know if he 
wrote a letter containing any details about the crime. 
It seems that in (I) Green contradicts himself by asserting that the prosecution’s evidence includes propositions 
he then asserts are false. If EST is true, his remarks seem contradictory because they are contradictory. He 
contradicts himself. It seems contradictory to say, ‘Although p is part of the prosecution’s evidence, *p’, it seems 
contradictory to say, ‘Although the prosecution knows p, *p’, and these both seem contradictory because both 
knowledge and evidence ascriptions are factive. 
Of course, some remarks seem contradictory even though they aren’t contradic- tions. Moorean absurd assertions 
are like this. Is it possible that Green’s remarks in (I) are like Moorean absurd assertions in this respect?23 I don’t 
think so. Here it’s helpful to look at both (I) and (II). In (II), Green’s remarks seem contradictory in the way that 
Moorean absurd assertions are and I shall argue that this supports EST. So, if you want to try to undermine the 
evidence I say (I) provides for EST by saying 
23 I owe the objection to an anonymous referee. 
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that Green’s remarks merely seem contradictory for the sort of reasons that Moorean absurd assertions are, you 
cannot block the argument for EST because Green’s remarks in (II) should not seem contradictory unless EST is 
true. 
Consider: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
p but I do not believe p [omissive Moorean absurdity]. Although *p, the prosecution is justified in believing p. p 
is part of the prosecution’s evidence, but *p [commissive]. p is part of the prosecution’s evidence, but I don’t 
believe p [omissive]. 
Those who deny EST are likely to prefer a view on which a subject’s evidence is constituted by the propositional 
contents of some of the subject’s non-factive mental states so would likely think that (2) and (3) are roughly 
equivalent. The problem is that (2) is not defective, but (3) is. So, those who deny EST need to explain why (3) is 
defective when (2) is perfectly felicitous. Someone could deny EST and deny that (2) and (3) are roughly 
equivalent, but presumably someone who denies EST should agree that (1)–(4) could be true. We know that (1) 
is defective, but the proposition it expresses could be true. If someone can be justified in believing a false 
proposition, the prosecution can. According to those who deny EST, although (3) and (4) seem contradictory, it 
is not because it expresses a contradiction. These claims seem contradictory for the same reason (1) does and 
nobody thinks the defects of (1) constitute evidence that truth entails belief. 
On a standard story about (1), (1) seems defective because the speaker who asserts it expresses a commitment to 
the truth of p while disavowing any such commitment. Notice that if you offer a similar account of (3) and (4), 
you have to say that the speaker who asserts (3) expresses a commitment to p that the speaker disavows by 
asserting p’s negation. Now we can see the problem for those who deny EST—the only credible explanation as 
to how someone who asserts (3) expresses a commitment to p assumes EST. If EST isn’t true, why would the 
speaker express a commitment to p by expressing the belief that p is part of someone else’s evidence? Similarly, 
in (4), the speaker says that p is part of the prosecution’s evidence and then asserts that she doesn’t know if p. 
Treating (4) along the lines of (1) requires us to say that the speaker is committed to the truth of p. Again, this 
explanation assumes EST and so does not subvert the linguistic argument for it. 
In response, someone might say that some rule of assertion could explain why (3) and (4) are defective.24 I do not 
think this will undercut the argument for EST, either. Suppose the kind of rule we’re considering is a rule that 
determines if an assertion is warranted. On the explanation we’re considering, Green lacks adequate warrant for 
asserting (3) and (4). If (3) and (4) are true, why can’t we have sufficient warrant for asserting them? Plausibly, 
knowledge is sufficient to warrant assertion. If you think Green does not have adequate warrant to assert (3) and 
(4), we should want to know why Green could not know that (3) or (4) are true. It cannot be that (3) and (4) 
cannot be true, that assumes EST. It cannot be that Green’s lacks adequate justification for believing (3) and (4). 
If EST is false and Green knows both what the 
24 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this possibility. 
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prosecution’s case is and facts that they are unaware of, he should be able to have adequate justification for 
believing these things. I don’t think Gettier cases always pop up when someone who believes (3) or (4) correctly 
and with justification. 
Instead, the idea might be that asserting (3) or (4) violates some Gricean maxim. Someone could say that the 
speaker who asserts, ‘The prosecution’s evidence includes p’ implies that she accepts p. So, by asserting this and 
failing to add that she herself believes *p or does not know whether p, the speaker generates the false implicature 
that she accepts p. Could this explain why (3) and (4) seem contradictory? They seem contradictory because the 
speaker implies that she accepts p but then disavows this commitment. 
The problem with this suggestion is that we are trying to explain why (3) and (4) seem contradictory. Suppose 
the speaker asserts, ‘The prosecution’s evidence includes p’ does conversationally imply that p or that she herself 
accepts p. If this is conversational implication rather than entailment, this implication should be cancellable. If 
you try to cancel it by asserting that *p or clarifying that you don’t know if p is true, that is what generates the 
apparent contradiction. (3) and (4) would be felicitous if the implication were cancellable. An account that 
predicts that (3) and (4) should be felicitous cannot explain why they seem defective. So, I don’t yet see any 
explanation of the linguistic data that doesn’t assume EST. 
3.2 Evidence and Explanation 
Here, I want to offer a second argument for EST, an argument that focuses on the role that evidence plays in 
explanatory inference. We gather some evidence, p. After considering the possible explanations, we judge that it 
is q that best explains the evidence, p. At this point, if we know q is the best explanation, we are also in a 
position to judge knowingly that it is because of q that p. (We shall assume that inference to best explanation can 
generate knowledge.) If we know that p is part of our evidence, it is not by some further step of reasoning that we 
come to know that p can figure in inferences like inference to the best explanation. If we know that p is true 
because q, we know that both p and q are true. This is because ‘p because q’ is factive in the explanans and 
explanandum positions. (Of course, we could gather a bit of evidence, p, and it could be that p is a brute fact. We 
know that if p is a brute fact, p is a fact.) So, now we have a second argument for EST. When you know that p is 
part of your evidence, you are in a position to know a disjunction that has p as a consequence because both 
disjuncts have p as a consequence. When you know that p is part of your evidence, you know that either (i) there 
is no explanation as to why p and so know p is a brute fact or (ii) there is some explanation or other as to why p, 
in which case you know there is some proposition, q, such that ‘p because q’ is true. You know that p is true if p 
is a brute fact or a fact explained by something else.25 
25 Strictly speaking, it does not follow from the (alleged) fact that ‘S knows p is part of S’s evidence’ entails p that ‘S’s evidence includes p’ 
entails p. It could be that p can be evidence even if *p, but p can only be known to be included in a body of evidence by someone who knows p 
is true. I cannot imagine any credible explanation as to why this would be. If p need not be true to be a piece of evidence, why would the falsity 
of p prevent you from knowing that p is part of someone’s evidence? If p is a piece of 
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We can also run an argument for EST by focusing on normative explanations rather than non-normative 
explanations. These normative explanations are expla- nations of normative facts. They involve explanatory 
claims of the form ‘You shouldn’t believe p because q’.26 Someone sympathetic to an evidentialist treatment of 
the epistemic ‘ought’ would likely think that when we gather evidence that strongly disconfirms some 
proposition, we can say things like, ‘You shouldn’t think that the intruder forced his way in because the window 
was broken from the inside’. Here, we cite a piece of evidence (i.e., that the window was broken from the inside) 
to explain why it is that a proposition shouldn’t be believed. This explanatory claim, if true, entails that the 
subject shouldn’t believe that the intruder forced his way in and that the window was broken from the inside. So, 
owing to the factivity of ‘because’ statements, someone sympathetic to evidentialist views on which facts about 
evidence are what explain facts about the normative status of various beliefs should be sympathetic to EST. 
These arguments cause serious trouble for E = B. The arguments for EST and IKSE seem to show that your 
evidence can outstrip the evidence your non-factive mental duplicates have on the plausible assumption that LF 
is true. If e-propositions that are (part of) the content of our perceptual experiences find their way into our 
evidence, we should reject the mentalist conception of evidence on which facts about our evidence strongly 
supervene upon facts about our non-factive mental states. 
An account that incorporates EST and IJSE but rejects ESK and KSE doesn’t face the objections to E = K we 
considered in §1. On the view that identifies your evidence with the true propositions you are non-inferentially 
justified in believing, Gettier conditions aren’t among the conditions that determine what evidence you have. The 
view does not imply that knowing p or knowing that p is part of your evidence requires being in a position to 
know if your belief in p is Gettiered. The view does not imply that propositions you deduce are true from 
propositions you know on inductive grounds have the evidential probability of 1. The differences between this 
view and E = K are relatively small. One of the aims of this paper is to show that you only need to make minor 
modifications to E = K to deal with the objections that have surfaced in the literature. So far, we’ve seen little 
reason to accept E = B and good reason to reject it. 
4 Objections 
In recent discussions of E = K, critics have argued that we ought to reject E = K on the grounds that it entails 
EST. Having defended EST in the previous section, I should address these objections. 
Footnote 25 continued evidence that no one could know belongs to someone’s evidence, is p really a central, important case? Remember, a 
standard view about evidence is that if you have it, you are in a pretty good position to know that you do. 
26 If talk of epistemic ‘should’ or ‘ought’ worries you, the points I am about to make could just as easily be made by focusing on claims 
about what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ to believe. 
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If E = K were true, the following principle would be true as well: 
E = K1: The proposition that p justified S in believing q only if S knows p. 
Owing to the factivity of knowledge, E = K1 implies EST. Owing to the consequences of EST, we are 
encouraged to reject E = K1 and E = K. Here, we shall focus on two objections to EST. The first is that it implies 
that Gettier cases are impossible. The second is that it is incompatible with an attractive closure principle for 
justified belief. Both objections rest on a mistaken assumption about the relationship between evidence and 
justified belief. 
4.1 Gettier Cases Comesan ̃a and Kantin ask us to consider one of Gettier’s examples, Coins: 
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the 
following conjunctive proposition: 
d. Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. 
Smith’s evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be 
selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: 
e. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he 
has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that 
unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins 
in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our 
example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is 
justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true 
in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s 
pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the 
man who will get the job.27 
This is one of Gettier’s original cases, but is it a Gettier case? It is if it is a case where (e) is true, Smith is 
justified in believing that (e) is true, but Smith does not know that (e) is true. 
Comesan ̃a and Kantin argue that anyone who accepts E = K1 has to deny that Coins is a Gettier case: 
27 Gettier (1963: 122). 123 
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(1) (2) 
(3) 
According to E = K1, no false propositions can constitute evidence. If no false propositions can constitute 
evidence, Coins is not a genuine Gettier case.28 However, Coins is a Gettier case. 
(C1) There are false propositions can constitute evidence. (C2) We must reject E = K1 and EST. 
The argument’s crucial premise is (2). In its defense, they say: 
Now, everyone should agree that the proposition that Jones has ten coins in his pocket is something Smith 
knows, and that is part of what justifies Smith in believing that whoever got the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
Everyone should also agree that the proposition that the secretary said that Jones got the job is something that 
you know ... and it certainly plays some role in justifying Smith in believing that whoever got the job has ten 
coins in his pocket. But for this strategy to work, it should be the case that everything that justifies you in 
believing that whoever got the job has ten coins in his pocket is a proposition that you know. E = K1 is the claim 
that a proposition p cannot be part of your justification for believing something unless you know that p ... And 
there is no argument that we can think of to the effect that Smith’s belief that Jones got the job plays no part 
whatsoever in justifying Smith in thinking that whoever got the job has ten coins in his pocket.29 
Williamson does say, ‘‘in any possible situation in which one believes a proposition p, that belief is justified, if at 
all, by propositions q1, ..., qn ... which one knows.’’30 This might suggest that insofar as Smith’s belief in (d) is 
mistaken, Smith’s evidence cannot include the proposition that (d) is true. So, it might seem that E = K1 implies 
that Smith’s belief in (d) is not part of what justifies Smith in believing (e). 
This is not how Williamson describes Gettier cases.31 In subjecting audiences to real life Gettier cases of his own 
design, he describes his subjects as believing justifiably false propositions on the basis of his testimony, 
testimony that consists entirely of lies. When the subjects deduce a true belief from the false, justified belief that 
is well supported by the evidence he’s given them, he says they have justified beliefs that fail to constitute 
knowledge. Is he entitled to describe the case in this way? 
I think he is. If I might respond on his behalf, there are three things to say in response to Comesan ̃a and Kantin’s 
objection to E = K1 and EST. First, we need to distinguish between two objections. The first is that EST is 
incompatible with the existence of Gettier cases. The second is that EST incompatible with (3). The second 
objection is serious, but it is not nearly as serious as the first. It’s one thing to 
28 Dreher (1974: 435) thinks that false propositions cannot constitute evidence, but thinks that Gettier cases are nevertheless genuine 
counterexamples to the JTB analysis. Shope (1983: 82) agrees. 
29 Comesan ̃ a and Kantin (2010: 450). 30 Williamson (2000: 185). 31 Williamson (2007a: 192). 
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say that a putative Gettier case isn’t genuine and another to say that there’s no such thing as a genuine Gettier 
case. Luckily, the first objection is easily dealt with. Early in the post-Gettier literature, some claimed that 
Gettier’s cases weren’t genuine. Skeptics thought that Smith could not justifiably believe (e) because the 
reasoning that led Smith to believe (e) relied essentially on a falsehood (i.e., that (d) is the case).32 Feldman 
showed that it is possible to construct no false lemma cases (i.e., cases in which a subject is justified in believing 
p to be the case, p is the case, but the subject fails to knows that p is the case even though none of the subject’s 
beliefs are mistaken).33 Such cases show that there is no reason to take EST to be incompatible with the existence 
of Gettier cases as such. 
Second, Comesan ̃a and Kantin’s objection has rhetorical force because it makes it seem as if those who accept 
EST deny the obvious. It is obvious that there are Gettier cases and Coins looks like a good one. While I’m 
relatively confident that (3) is true, I think my confidence in (3) would decrease if I were convinced that 
Comesan ̃a and Kantin were right about what it takes for Coins to be a Gettier case. To believe with a high 
degree of confidence that they are right about what it takes for Coins to be a Gettier case and that Coins is a 
Gettier case, I have to believe with a high degree of confidence that EST is false and that there is a way of 
dealing with the evidence that seems to support it. Since I have little confidence in the conjunction of (2) and (3), 
I have little confidence in their objection to EST and E = K1. 
Of course, Coins still presents a problem for E = K1 because this is a case where the subject reasons from a false 
belief in (d) to a further belief in (e) and the worry is that E = K1 implies the false belief in (d) cannot justify 
believing (e), in which case Coins doesn’t meet the conditions necessary for it to be a genuine Gettier case. 
I quoted the original text in its entirety so that the reader saw that Gettier describes the case as one in which 
Smith’s evidence for (d) consists entirely of true propositions. There is nothing in Gettier’s article that suggests 
that he thinks (2) is true. Nevertheless, we know why Comesan ̃a and Kantin think that (2) is true. If E = K1 and 
EST are true, they claim, ‘‘it should be the case that everything that justifies [Smith] in believing that whoever 
got the job has ten coins in his pocket’’ is 
32 Pappas and Swain thought that it was plausible to maintain, ‘‘If an essential part of the reasoning from the evidence to the accepted 
proposition, h, proceeds through a false step, then acceptance of h is not justified’’ (1978: 15). Lowy (1978) saw that this principle is no 
obstacle to the construction of Gettier cases. She argued that Gettier was focused on believers who are justified in believing propositions rather 
beliefs that are justified. If, as she suggests, ascriptions of personal justification (‘S is justified in believing p’) do not entail ascriptions of 
doxastic justification (‘S’s belief that p is justified’), someone could hold that you cannot justifiably believe p if that belief is based on 
reasoning that proceeds through a false step but could have a person justified in believing things having reasoned from false beliefs. In this 
paper, I have not been careful to mark the distinction between personal and doxastic justification. In Littlejohn (2009), I argue that we ought to 
recognize this distinction and show that it is useful for reconciling externalism accounts of justified belief with intuitions that some say favor 
internalism. My own view is someone can be justified in believing false propositions but there cannot be false, justified beliefs. Again, see 
Lowy’s paper for an explanation as to how someone could say that there cannot be false, justified beliefs but can be Gettier cases. 
33 See Feldman (1974). 123 
Evidence and Knowledge 259 
known to Smith to be the case.34 Since the false belief in (d) plays a role in Smith’s acquisition of the justified 
belief in (e), it seems E = K1 and EST are mistaken. 
To understand why this objection fails, we need to understand the different roles that Smith’s beliefs and his 
evidence play in the justification of his beliefs. As Comesan ̃a and Kantin acknowledge, the evidence that led 
Smith to form the false belief in (d) consisted entirely of true propositions. Given EST, we cannot say that (d) is 
evidence that goes towards justifying Smith’s belief in (e), but I see no reason to deny that Smith’s false belief in 
(d) plays some role in justifying his belief in (e). We saw earlier that a belief can play a role in helping someone 
to acquire new justified beliefs even if that belief’s content is not part of the subject’s evidence. Think back to 
our case from earlier of inductive knowledge and knowledge of the deductive consequences of such knowledge. 
A subject believes something on inductive grounds and then deduces that an obvious consequence of that 
proposition is true. Intuitively, the belief known on the basis of inductive grounds plays a role in justifying 
further beliefs even though the proposition believed on inductive grounds never itself becomes part of the 
evidence. If S’s justified belief that p is the case can serve as the basis for justifiably believing q even if p is not 
part of S’s evidence (as we saw happens when someone believes that the fox eating blueberries is female on 
inductive grounds and deduces that the fox eating berries is a vixen), this could happen in Coins as well. If he 
didn’t believe (d), it isn’t clear how the Smith would connect the evidence available to justify believing (e) but 
by connecting (d) to (e), he transmits the evidential support that supports believing (d) to support believing (e). 
There are differences between Coins and the cases discussed earlier, to be sure. There is this similarity. Prior to 
believing (d), (*d) is consistent with Smith’s evidence. We know this is so because we know that (d) is false and 
the evidence for believing (d) consists of true propositions. Is the hypothesis that (*e) consistent with Smith’s 
evidence? It is prior to believing (d). The only evidence Smith has for believing (e) at this stage is the evidence 
he has for believing (d), evidence entails neither (d) nor (e). So, if you’re going to say that (d) is part of the 
evidence for (e), you’ll have to say that after Smith comes to believe (d), Smith has entailing evidence for 
believing (e) in spite of the fact that the evidence he had prior to believing (d) entailed neither (d) nor (e). This 
doesn’t strike me as a plausible interpretation of the case. It seems more plausible that the hypothesis that (*d) 
and the hypothesis that (*e) are consistent with Smith’s evidence throughout the story (i.e., the evidential 
probabilities of (d) and (e) remain less than 1 throughout) even if these propositions at various points are 
inconsistent with what Smith justifiably believes. 
If there is some principled reason to reject my response to Comesan ̃a and Kantin’s objection, it has to be that the 
following principle is true: 
JE: The belief that p is part of what justifies S in believing that q only if p is included in S’s evidence. 
Why? The objection was intended as an objection to E = K1 because of the (alleged) connection between E = K1 
and EST. The thought was that if EST were 
34 Comesan ̃a and Kantin (2010: 5). 
123 
260 C. Littlejohn 
true, false propositions could not constitute evidence, and so beliefs in false propositions based on evidence 
could not transmit justification to further beliefs by means of inference. Thus, Gettier cases like Coins would not 
be a counterexample to the JTB analysis of knowledge. If we were to deny JE, there would be no objection E = 
K1 and no objection to EST. Because JE is mistaken, the objection fails.35 
We should reject JE because it is incompatible with a kind of fallibilism about justification: 
F: S can justifiably believe p even if the evidential probability of p for S is less than 1.36 
The problem with denying fallibilism so understood is that many of the things we know about the external world, 
we know on inductive grounds. We cannot have such knowledge unless F is true. Knowing p requires justifiably 
believing p, and so it follows from the denial of F that knowing p requires an evidential probability of p of 1. We 
cannot have that in the case of inductive knowledge. So, infallibilism engenders a kind of scepticism. 
Not only is this kind of scepticism an inherently unattractive position, the sceptic who denies F denies that Coins 
is a genuine Gettier case. Remember, Coins is a Gettier case only if Smith’s belief in (d) is justified. That belief 
is based on fallible grounds, it is false but the evidence that supports it consists entirely of true propositions, and 
so if you deny F, you have to deny that Smith justifiably believes (d). You cannot object to E = K1 and EST on 
the grounds that these theses imply that Coins is not a Gettier case if your objection assumes JE and JE implies 
that Coins is not a Gettier case on its own. If (3) is true, JE is false. If (3) is false, Comesan ̃a and Kantin’s 
objection fails. If JE is true, (2) is false. If (2) is false, the objection fails. 
4.2 Justification and Closure 
Comesan ̃a and Kantin offer a second objection to E = K1, which is that it is incompatible with this closure 
principle: 
JC: If S is justified in believing that p and S competently deduces that q from p, thereby coming to believe q, 
without ceasing to be justified in believing p, then S is justified in believing q. 
They argue as follows: 
According to E = K1, a belief that p can justify S in believing something only if S knows that p. But let is 
suppose that S is justified in believing that p but doesn’t know that p ... If that is so, then S is not justified in 
believing that q even if she is justified in believing (indeed, even if she knows) that p entails q and deduces that q 
on this basis without ceasing to be justified in believing 
35 36 That is to say, S can justifiably believe p even if the epistemic probability of p (i.e., the conditional 
For further objections to JE, see Neta (2008: 102). probability of p on S’s evidence) is less than 1. 
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that p—for S’s evidence for q is p, and S doesn’t know p. Therefore, if E = K1 is true, then closure fails.37 
Remember that E = K1 is a claim about evidence and justification, not beliefs and the way that beliefs transmit 
justification. E = K1 commits us to saying that false propositions cannot be evidence, not that false beliefs cannot 
help us acquire new justified beliefs by transmitting evidence that support other beliefs to support new ones. 
Even if E = K1 is true, there can be false, justified beliefs supported by inductive grounds consisting of true 
propositions. Suppose that the fox eating the blueberries happened to be the first male fox ever seen eating a 
berry. If the subject knew that of the hundreds of observed foxes prior to this event no male fox had eaten a berry 
then inferred justifiably that (i) the same is true of the fox seen now and then inferred (ii) that the fox seen now is 
a vixen, the belief in (ii) is as well supported as belief in (i) and no better supported if the only evidence the 
subject has for believing (ii) is the evidence that supports (i). If you say that the proposition believed in believing 
(i) becomes part of the subject’s evidence for believing (ii), you would have to say that (*ii) is inconsistent with 
the subject’s evidence. That cannot be true since that the subject’s belief is inferred from a merely inductively 
justified belief. 
Neither E = K1 nor EST commits us to denying JC unless we assume JE. But, as we saw, JE is incompatible with 
the sort of fallibilist assumptions that we need to say that we can be justified on the basis of fallible but good 
inductive grounds. We can say that what is believed when S falsely believes p does not provide the evidence 
necessary for justified belief in q, even if whenever S’s belief that p is true is justified there is sufficient evidence 
for the justified acceptance of the obvious consequences of that belief. Competent deduction allows you to apply 
the evidence that supports the false belief in p to beliefs known to be consequences of that belief. The evidence 
sufficient for justifying the belief that p should suffice to justify the known consequences of that belief without 
the proposition that p adding to the evidence for believing the known consequences of p. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that the right account of evidence will deviate from E = K, but the differences 
between the right account and E = K will be minor. There are things we know that do not belong to our evidence 
(e.g., the things we know by means of inductive inference and subsequent inferences). There are things that 
belong to our evidence that we do not know (e.g., true propositions we do not know for purely Gettierish 
reasons). We can remain firmly committed to an externalist account of evidence, one that identifies evidence 
with true propositions we know about the external world on the basis of observation. I did not settle on a final 
view in this paper, but an attractive view that is consistent with everything I’ve argued for in this paper says that 
your evidence consists of the true propositions you are non-inferentially justified in believing. 
37 Comesan ̃a and Kantin (2010: 8). 
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